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ABSTRACT
Many decision makers operate in dynamic environments, in which markets, competitors,
and technology change regularly. The ability to detect and respond to these regime shifts is
critical for economic success. We conduct three experiments to test how effective individuals
are at detecting such regime shifts. Specifically, we investigate when individuals are most likely
to under-react to change and when they are most likely to over-react to it. We develop a systemneglect hypothesis: individuals react primarily to the signals they observe and secondarily to the
environmental system that produced the signal. Three experiments, two involving probability
estimation and one involving prediction, reveal a behavioral pattern consistent with our systemneglect hypothesis: under-reaction is most common in unstable environments with precise
signals and over-reaction is most common in stable environments with noisy signals. We test
this pattern formally in a statistical comparison of the Bayesian model with a parametric
specification of the system-neglect model.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Decision makers must often make decisions in unstable environments. An investor must
elect whether to keep her investments in equity. A Central Bank must decide whether a weakening
economy merits an interest rate cut. A conventional retailer must decide whether to embrace an
Internet strategy. In each of these examples a decision maker receives a “signal” (e.g, a series of
poor earnings announcements, an unexpectedly high unemployment figure, an onslaught of “etailers”) and must judge whether that signal augurs a new regime (e.g., the onset of a bear market, an
economy headed toward recession, a shift to an online economy), or is just an extreme outcome from
the incumbent regime.
The ability of decision makers to correctly identify the onset of a new regime can mean the
difference between success and failure. Indeed, the difficulty of separating “signal” from “noise” has
led to well-publicized instances of over-reaction (i.e., believing a regime shift has occurred before it
actually has), as well as under-reaction (i.e., believing a regime shift has not occurred when in fact it
has).

Consider two examples.

In the late-1980’s, Xerox observed Japanese semiconductor

manufacturers shifting resources to a new, X-ray-based manufacturing method. Xerox, believing this
indicated a fundamental shift in semiconductor technology, reallocated significant company
resources to this new approach. Years later it was clear that such a shift did not occur and, in fact,
would not for the foreseeable future (Grove, 1999). Conversely, in the late-1970’s, Schwinn was
slow to respond to the advent of the mountain bike. Management believed that the surge in mountain
bike popularity was just another “fad”. Schwinn’s reluctance to introduce a mountain bike cost the
company its dominance in the American bicycle market and contributed to its eventual bankruptcy
(Crown & Coleman, 1996).
For obvious reasons, these examples must be interpreted with caution. In order to understand
the factors that impact the ability of individuals to detect regime shifts more precisely, we investigate
under- and over-reaction experimentally. We conduct three studies and find that individuals exhibit
systematic biases in their ability to detect regime shifts. Subjects in our studies observe signals, and
based on these signals indicate whether there has been a shift from one regime to a second regime.
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We employ an experimental paradigm in which the first regime is represented by an urn that contains
more red than blue balls (a “red urn”), and the second regime is represented by an urn that contains
more blue than red balls (a “blue urn”). At any time, the experiment may switch from drawing balls
from the red urn to drawing balls from the blue urn. In this setup, three values are needed for
determining the appropriate (Bayesian) reaction: (i) the signal: the sequence of red and blue balls
observed; (ii) signal diagnosticity: the degree to which the red urn differs from the blue urn; and (iii)
transition probability: the chance that the system will remain with the red urn, or switch to the blue
urn. This simple experimental paradigm is intended to capture the essential features of many realworld situations. For an investor deciding whether to keep her investments in equity, the two states
might be a “bull market” and “bear market”. An earnings announcement is an informative but
imprecise signal, with the informativeness of this signal varying across markets and over time.
Finally, the market may vacillate between these two states, with the historical frequency of change
captured by the transition probability.
We posit and find strong evidence for a system-neglect hypothesis:

individuals pay

inordinate attention to the signal, and neglect diagnosticity and transition probability, the aspects of
the system that generated the signal. Moreover, we suggest that system neglect leads to a predictable
pattern of under- and over-reaction:

individuals are most prone to under-reaction in unstable

environments with precise signals and to over-reaction in stable environments with noisy signals.
Our three studies, two judgment tasks and a choice task, show that subjects do exhibit substantial
system neglect and that such system neglect does indeed result in the posited pattern of under- and
over-reaction.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we review previous empirical research on the
detection of regime shifts, as well as relevant research on judgment in stationary environments. We
extend these ideas and develop the system-neglect hypothesis. We test this hypothesis in three
studies. In Section 3, we present a judgment study in which subjects judge the posterior probability
that the process has switched regimes (from the red urn to the blue urn). In Section 4, we present a
second judgment study that rules out error as an explanation for our results. In Section 5, we present
a choice study in which subjects predict the next observation. In all three studies we find strong
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evidence of system neglect, a lack of sensitivity to the system characteristics, diagnosticity and
stability, and the predicted pattern of over- and under-reaction. We provide formal support for this
insensitivity by estimating a family of “quasi-Bayesian” models. We conclude in Section 6 with a
discussion of the implications of the research and an outline of future work.

2. BACKGROUND
Previous Research
We briefly outline some of the major empirical findings in the study of regime-shift
detection. The studies have varied considerably in methodology. In some studies, the sequences
were presented sequentially (Robinson, 1964; Chinnis & Peterson, 1968, 1970; Barry & Pitz, 1979),
while in other studies, a sequence was provided in its entirety (Theios et al., 1971). Some subjects
estimated when the process changed from one regime to another (Barry & Pitz, 1979; Theios et al.,
1971), whereas other subjects estimated the probability that the data were drawn from one regime or
another (Chinnis & Peterson, 1968, 1970). Studies have also varied environmental parameters such
as diagnosticity (Robinson, 1964; Chinnis & Peterson, 1968, 1970), the payoff structure (Barry &
Pitz, 1979), and the rate at which subjects receive stimuli (Robinson, 1964).
These studies have shown that individuals generally respond to the possibility of change and
do so in the right direction. Beyond that, though, results are mixed. Across these studies, some
behavior is approximately optimal (Chinnis & Peterson, 1968), but most is not (Barry & Pitz, 1979;
Theios et al., 1971). Studies find both under-reaction (Barry & Pitz, 1979; Chinnis & Peterson,
1968) and over-reaction (Brown & Bane, 1975; Chinnis & Peterson, 1970; Estes, 1984). One of the
few themes connecting this literature is the idea that individuals respond partially to changing
environmental conditions. Chinnis & Peterson (1968) state: “(t)he subjects, while sensitive to the
difference in diagnostic value of the data in the two conditions, were not adequately sensitive” (p.
625). For example, Barry & Pitz (1979) systematically vary payoffs and find individual behavior
largely unchanged. This theme resonates with the system-neglect hypothesis we develop in the next
section.
Rapoport et al. (1979) provide a more comprehensive treatment of change detection, formally
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modeling the decision environment and evaluating optimal policies. They develop and test three
descriptive models in which individuals act only when the signal provides evidence exceeding some
“threshold”. Critically, these models incorporate extreme versions of system neglect that do not
reflect any sensitivity to environmental conditions. For example, one model recognizes a change
when the signal exceeds some fixed probability threshold.1
We suggest that the threshold model is too extreme. Instead, we hypothesize that individuals
respond to changes in environmental conditions, but insufficiently so. In other words, their behavior
is dictated more by signals than by the system generating the signals. We call this the system-neglect
hypothesis. In the next section, we show how system neglect leads to under-reaction in some
conditions and over-reaction in others.

Research Hypothesis
Our system-neglect hypothesis draws on judgment and decision making research in static
environments. Our specific point of departure is Griffin & Tversky (1992), who reconciled two wellestablished,

but

seemingly

contradictory,

findings:

conservatism

and

representativeness.

Conservatism posits that individuals update their beliefs too slowly in the face of new evidence
(Edwards, 1968; Grether, 1980). Representativeness, on the other hand, suggests that individuals
extrapolate too readily from small samples, leading to belief revisions that are too dramatic
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1973). Griffin & Tversky showed that sample size can account for this
apparent contradiction.

Most conservatism studies involve large samples, while most

representativeness studies involve smaller samples. Misunderstanding the impact of sample size on
the posterior probability leads subjects to make conservative revisions with large samples and radical
revisions with small samples.
More generally, Griffin & Tversky distinguished between the strength and weight of
evidence. Informally, the strength of evidence is its magnitude, while the weight of the evidence is
its reliability. Imagine you are asked which way a coin is biased, 70% heads or 70% tails. Here, the
proportion of heads represents the strength of evidence, while the sample size represents the weight
1

This modeling approach is similar to that taken by Barry & Pitz (1979), Brown & Bane (1975), Estes
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of evidence. Thus, 4 heads out of 5 flips has high strength but low weight, while 32 heads out of 60
flips has low strength but high weight. Griffin & Tversky showed that individuals systematically
overweight the strength of evidence or how well that evidence matches the hypothesis in question,
and underweight the weight of evidence or the diagnosticity of the signal. As a result, 4 heads out of
5 is seen to be more compelling than 32 heads of out of 60, contrary to Bayes Rule (since the
difference between the number of heads and tails is a sufficient statistic).
We apply this idea to the problem of regime-shift detection. In such problems, an individual
receives signals that are generated from one of two regimes. As in static environments, a decision
maker must consider the diagnosticity of the signal, i.e., how strongly correlated the signal is with the
regime that it favors. In a dynamic environment, a decision maker must also take into account the
transition probability, i.e., how likely it is to change from one regime to another. Although a
judgment about the likelihood of change should depend on both diagnosticity and transition
probability, we suggest that individuals will not incorporate these two system parameters optimally.
Instead, our system-neglect hypothesis posits that individuals respond primarily to the signal and
secondarily to the system that generated the signal. In the parlance of Griffin & Tversky (1992), the
signals provide the strength of evidence and the system parameters provide the weight of evidence.
A major reason that the signal is overweighted is that it is more salient: the signal is usually
in the foreground while the system parameters are in the background. In many situations, the system
parameters are not known and perhaps unknowable. In this sense, the system-neglect hypothesis is
akin to the correspondence bias or fundamental attribution error in social psychology (Jones &
Harris, 1967): Individuals tend to overestimate the extent to which behavior is due to disposition or
personality and underweight the extent to which behavior is caused by the underlying situation.
The system-neglect hypothesis yields an important prediction: overemphasizing the strength
of evidence at the expense of its weight means that individuals are most likely to under-react to an
indication of change when the weight of that evidence is high and over-react when the weight is low.
The weight of evidence is highest when diagnosticity is high and the system is unstable (i.e., high
transition probability), and lowest when diagnosticity is low and the system is stable (i.e., low
(1984), and Robinson (1964).
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transition probability). Thus, individuals should be most responsive to indications of change in
precise (high diagnosticity) and unstable (high transition probability) environments and least
responsive in noisy (low diagnosticity) and stable (low transition probability) environments. If
individuals behave similarly across systems, we should see a pattern with relatively more underreaction in precise/unstable environments and relatively more over-reaction in noisy/stable
environments. Griffin & Tversky (1992) apply a similar logic and show that a strength and weight
account predicts overconfidence when evidence has high strength and low weight (e.g., low
diagnosticity or small sample size), and underconfidence when evidence has low strength and high
weight (e.g., high diagnosticity or large sample size).
Transition Probability
Low
(Stable)
Low
(Noisy)

High
(Unstable)

OverReaction

Signal
Diagnosticity

High
(Precise)

UnderReaction

Figure 1: The system-neglect hypothesis: Predicted pattern of over- and under-reaction as
function of system parameters

Figure 1 depicts these predictions succinctly. It is important that our prediction is a relative
one: there should be relatively more over-reaction in the northwest cell, and relatively more underreaction in the southeast cell. The hypothesis is silent about absolute levels. Indeed, the systemneglect hypothesis is consistent with over-reaction everywhere, under-reaction everywhere, or a
mixed pattern, provided that the gradient slopes in the predicted direction. Note also that the
predictions of Figure 1 apply to indications-of-change. Reactions to indications-of-no-change (or
“business as usual”) should not follow this pattern. Rather, under-reaction to indications-of-nochange should be strongest in unstable systems with imprecise signals, since the base-rate of change
is highest and the signal least informative.
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We test the system-neglect hypothesis in three studies by manipulating diagnosticity and
transition probability and varying the task participants face.

3. STUDY 1: JUDGMENT TASK
Our experimental setting allows us to compare individual performance against a normative
standard and thus test our behavioral predictions. The decision makers in our experimental paradigm
have all the information necessary to calculate Bayesian responses and hence provide optimal
judgments. This allows us to focus our analysis very specifically on the manner in which individuals
revise probability judgments, and how these judgments deviate from Bayesian updating.

Statistical Process
We begin by describing the statistical process used in our experiment. The statistical process
is depicted in Figure 2. Subjects observe signals generated by one of two regimes. The task is to
detect if and when the system shifts from one regime to the other. The two possible regimes are red
and blue. Let Rt ( Bt ) indicate that the process is in the red (blue) regime in period t. Each of the
two regimes produces two possible signals: a red ball or a blue ball. While both regimes can produce
either color, the red regime favors red balls (producing them with probability pR > 0.5 ) and the blue
regime favors blue balls (producing red balls with probability pB < 0.5 ). In our studies, these
probabilities are always symmetric, i.e., pR = 1 − pB . Thus, pR / pB is a measure of the diagnosticity
(d) of the signal, with a higher value indicating a more diagnostic signal.
The transition between the two regimes is defined by three characteristics. First, in period 0,
before the first signal is drawn, the process is in the red regime ( Pr( R0 ) = 1 ). Second, before each
signal is produced, including the first one, the process might switch to the blue regime. The
probability of such a switch is the transition probability, q = Pr( Bt +1 | Rt ) . (This is called a “switch
probability” in our experimental stimuli.) Third, the blue regime is an absorbing state, i.e., if the
process switches to the blue regime it remains there until the end of the trial ( Pr( Bt +1 | Bt ) = 1 ).
Again recall the investor example from our introduction.

Diagnosticity captures the

informativeness of a signal such as an earnings announcement, while the transition probability
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captures the stability of a bull or bear market, e.g., the likelihood that a bull market turns into a bear
market. Although the absorbing state is a simplifying assumption in our model, for many decision
horizons there will be at most one change. For example, most equity markets cycle between bull and
bear markets at a sufficiently low frequency that for a given decision one can (and probably should)
think of the new regime as an absorbing state. Of course, there are many other situations in which
there is truly an absorbing state (e.g., an equipment failure, an obsolete technology, etc.).
System
Reliability
(Diagnosticity)

Red Bin

Instability
(Transition
Probability)

Regimes

60% Red Balls
40% Blue Balls

Blue Bin
40% Red Balls
60% Blue Balls

Signal

2%
Transition Probability

Figure 2: Statistical Process

Methodology
Study 1 was conducted on computer using a specially designed Visual Basic program. We
recruited 40 University of Chicago subjects, advertising the task as a “probability estimation task” in
order to yield subjects comfortable with probability. The median number of undergraduate and
graduate mathematics and statistics classes taken by each subject was three.
The computer program began by introducing the statistical process used in the experiment,
and illustrated the process using 4 demonstration trials and 2 practice trials. Detailed instructions and
screen shots of the program are found in the Electronic Companion Paper (henceforth, ECP).
Following the introduction, each subject completed 18 trials consisting of 10 signals (periods). Each
trial was governed by a different set of parameters (see below). Subjects were first shown the
parameters, pR , pB , and q, governing that trial. These parameters were displayed continuously
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throughout each trial, and subjects were told that the parameters would change across trials. They
were then shown a sequence of red or blue balls drawn randomly based on the set of parameters.
After seeing each signal, subjects indicated the probability that the last ball was drawn from the blue
regime (i.e., the probability that the statistical process had changed). Subjects were not allowed to
change a probability once it was entered.
We used 3 different diagnosticity levels and 4 different transition-probability levels, yielding
12 experimental conditions. Diagnosticity levels ( d = pR / pB ) were 1.5, 3, and 9, corresponding to
( pR , pB ) values of (.6,.4) , (.75,.25) , and (.9,.1) . The transition probabilities were .02, .05, .10, and

.20. We chose the diagnosticity levels and transition probabilities to span a “reasonable” range of the
parameter space. For example, 3 of 15 sequences show a regime shift for q = .02 , while 12 of 15
sequences do so for q = .20 , so moving the transition probability in either direction would yield a
process that either always or never produced regime change during our series. We randomly
generated 5 unique sequences for each condition, using a statistical process with the true parameter
values, yielding 60 sequences in total (the actual sequences are found in ECP). Each of the subjects
received 18 of the 60 sequences in a randomized order, and at least one sequence from each of the 12
conditions. Each of the 60 sequences was judged by a total of 12 subjects.
We paid subjects according to a quadratic scoring system that paid $0.10 maximum (e.g., if a
subject indicated with certainty that the process was in the blue regime, and the process was in fact in
the blue regime) and -$0.10 minimum (e.g., if a subject indicated with certainty that the process was
in the blue regime, and the process was in fact in the red regime). Such a scheme is proper, and thus
truth-revealing for risk-neutral subjects (Brier, 1950).
Subjects were given feedback at the end of each trial about if and when the process shifted
from the red regime to the blue regime. They were also informed how much money they made or
lost on that particular trial.

Normative Model
Our dependent measures are the probability judgments provided by subjects. We evaluate
these probabilities by comparing them to a Bayesian standard. To do so, we derive the Bayesian
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solution for our experimental framework (see Appendix). Let rt denote the t-th signal, where rt = 1
( rt = 0 ) if a red (blue) ball is drawn in period t, and H t = (r1,..., rt ) be the sequence of signals through
period t. The Bayesian posterior odds of a change to the blue regime after observing history H t can
be expressed as
⎛

⎞

t

⎛ 1 − (1 − q)t ⎞ t q(1 − q) j −1 t +1− j −⎜⎜⎝ 2 ∑ r ⎟⎟⎠
=
d
=
,
⎜
⎟∑
1 − ptb Pr( Rt | H t ) ⎝ (1 − q)t ⎠ j =1 1 − (1 − q)t
ptb

Pr( Bt | H t )

k

k= j

(3.1)

where ptb denotes the Bayesian probability that the process has switched to the blue regime by t.
The expression can be decomposed into several components.

The first component,

(1 − (1 − q) ) /(1 − q) , is a function only of the transition probability q and the number of signals t and
t

t

provides a base rate for the likelihood of a change, i.e., the likelihood of change in the absence of any
⎛
⎜
⎝

t +1− j − ⎜ 2

data. The last component, d

⎞

t

∑ r ⎟⎟
k

k= j

⎠

, is simply the diagnosticity raised to an exponent reflecting the

difference between number of blue balls and red balls drawn over the part of the history from period j
to period t. (This last component determines the posterior probability in a stationary environment [cf.
Edwards, 1968].) The middle component provides mathematical weights accounting for the various
paths through which the process can change from the red regime to the blue regime.

Experimental Results
We present both aggregate and individual-level results. Recall that our experiment required
that each of our 40 subjects provide subjective probabilities that the process had switched to the blue
regime for each of 10 signals in 18 trials. Consider first an overview of these judgments. Let pte be
the empirical judgment and | pte − ptb | be the absolute difference between the subject’s judgment and
the Bayesian probability for signal t. The mean absolute difference was .17 (median=.08, sd=.21).
Subjects’ payments were based on the difference between their subjective probability of a change to
the blue regime and the actual regime (1 if blue, 0 if red). The mean of this absolute difference was
.25 (median=.05, sd=.34), generating an average payment of $11.62 (median=$11.99, range of $6.60
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to $14.67). The average payment to a Bayesian agent would have been $14.23 (median=$14.22,
range of $12.72 to $15.38).
Our primary interest, however, is belief revision – how probability judgments respond to new
signals.

Thus, we consider changes in probabilities rather than absolute levels and compare

empirical changes in probability judgments with normative changes. Defining empirical change is
straightforward: ∆pte = pte − pte−1 . Constructing a proper normative measure of change requires a bit
more care.

In calculating the normative response to a signal t, we take a subject’s previous

probability judgment pte−1 as the “prior” rather than the previous Bayesian probability, ptb−1 . If we
use Bayes Rule with pte−1 as the “prior”, we get
1− 2 rt

pte−1 ⎛ 1 ⎞ ⎛ pR ⎞
=
⎜
⎟⎜ ⎟
1 − ptb 1 − pte−1 ⎝ 1 − q ⎠ ⎜⎝ pB ⎟⎠
ptb

1− 2 rt

⎛ q ⎞ ⎛ pR ⎞
+⎜
⎟ ⎜⎜ ⎟⎟
⎝ 1 − q ⎠ ⎝ pB ⎠

,

(3.2)

where ptb is the Bayesian response to signal rt taking pte−1 as the prior.
This redefinition allows our “normative change” measure to reflect a subject’s belief prior to
receiving a signal. Thus, regardless of the accuracy of a subject’s prior belief, our procedure
automatically adjusts to that prior in order to evaluate the subject’s belief revision. If, for example, a
subject’s previous judgment was low relative to the Bayesian probability, she should be “allowed” to
make a more dramatic revision in light of the new signal (indeed, she is expected to). Conversely, if
a subject’s previous judgment was too high relative to Bayes Rule, there is less room for her to
subsequently increase her judgment and therefore she should make a more conservative revision.
Since the objective is to focus on the revision itself, we take as the normative change measure,

∆ptb = ptb − pte−1 , and compare this measure to the empirical change measure, ∆pte = pte − pte−1 .
We restrict our attention to median judgments to minimize the role asymmetric error may
play in generating system neglect (Erev, Wallsten, & Budescu, 1994). Erev et al. offer an error
account in which responses are unbiased “true judgments” perturbed by error. This account requires
that the median response be unbiased. In Study 2, we control for error more systematically. We also
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report mean judgments in ECP.2
We first show that subjects are attentive to differences in signals. As expected, the median
empirical change, ∆pte , is considerably different for blue signals than red signals, .084 versus .001.
The median normative change measures are .158 and −.028 for blue and red, respectively. Thus, the
median difference between the empirical change and normative change, ∆pte − ∆ptb , our summary
measure of over- and under-reaction, is slightly negative for blue signals (−.074), indicating a small
overall tendency to under-react to indications of change.
To test for system neglect, we consider how our measure of under-reaction, ∆pte − ∆ptb , varies
across conditions. Recall that the predicted gradient shown in Figure 1 applies only to indications of
change, thus we restrict our attention to blue signals. The system-neglect hypothesis implies that
under-reaction is more common when diagnosticity and transition probability are high than when
diagnosticity and transition probability are low. Indeed, the median normative change, ∆ptb , is .231
in the high transition-probability/high diagnosticity condition, and .056 in the low transitionprobability/low diagnosticity condition. In contrast, the median empirical change, ∆pte , across the
two conditions is much less differentiated, .116 and .022, respectively.
Figure 3 depicts the difference between the empirical and normative change measures in each
of our 12 experimental conditions. Note first that we observe under-reaction in 11 of the 12
conditions and over-reaction in 1 of the 12 conditions. By itself this pattern does not provide
evidence for or against the system-neglect hypothesis. What matters is the gradient between the
southeast cell (high diagnosticity and transition probability) and the northwest cell (low diagnosticity
and transition probability). Consistent with system neglect, the greatest under-reaction occurs in the
southeast-most cell, while the second least under-reaction occurs in the northwest-most cell. In the
majority of the pairwise comparisons (37 of 48), the pattern of under-reaction is monotonic as

2

We calculate the median change for each of the 600 observations (60 trials and 10 observations per trial)
and then take the average across the appropriate category. For example, to calculate the median empirical change
for a red ball, we take the median empirical change for the 329 (of 600) observations in which the signal is a red
ball. We then take the average of these 329 medians. This method reflects the lumpiness with which subjects use
the response scale. Taking the average over the medians provides us with a “smoother” measure.
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transition probability and diagnosticity increase, as predicted by system neglect. The lack of perfect
monotonicity partially reflects stimuli which are randomly generated and hence not necessarily
“representative” of the underlying process.

Over-Reaction

Median Change in Estimates:
Empirical - Bayesian

2%

0%

-2%

-4%

-6%

-8%
1.5
-10%

3

Under-Reaction
2%

9

5%

Diagnosticity

10%
20%

Transition Probability

Figure 3: Over- and under-reaction, by condition, as measured by the median difference
between change in empirical probability judgments and change in Bayesian probabilities,
∆pte − ∆ptb (Study 1, Judgment Task).

Estimation
The pattern in Figure 3 provides support for the system-neglect hypothesis. It is possible but
unlikely that the hypothesized pattern reflects artifacts in the randomly generated sequences. Thus,
we provide a formal test of the system-neglect hypothesis by generalizing (3.1). We call these
generalizations quasi-Bayesian models in the spirit of Edwards (1968), who examined signal
sensitivity in his study of conservatism (see also Chinnis & Peterson, 1968, 1970). The models are
Bayesian in structure, but include additional parameters to accord more closely with the empirical
observations.
In order to model sensitivity to the two critical dimensions, transition probability and
diagnosticity, we add two parameters, α and β, to our Bayesian expression (3.1). Adding these
parameters yields
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t
j −1
p
Pr( Bt | H t ) ⎛ 1 − (1 − αq) ⎞ t q(1 − q)
=
d
=
⎜
⎟∑
1 − pte Pr( Rt | H i ) ⎝ (1 − αq)t ⎠ j =1 1 − (1 − q)t

e
t

⎡

⎛

⎢
⎣

⎜
⎝

β ⎢t +1− j − ⎜ 2

t

⎞⎤

k= j

⎠⎦

∑ rk ⎟⎟⎥⎥

,

(3.3)

where pte is the subject’s probability judgment that the process has switched to the blue regime by t.
In (3.3), α captures sensitivity to transition probability, while β captures sensitivity to diagnosticity.
This specification has several useful properties. The expression is Bayesian when α = 1 and β = 1 .
As α shrinks, the transition probability plays an increasingly small role (as α → 0 , pte → 0 ). As

β shrinks,

the

signal

has

an

increasingly

small

impact

(as

β→0,

pte /(1 − pte ) →

(1 − (1 − αq)t ) /(1 − αq)t , i.e., the “base rate” odds of change in the absence of information). We term

the model in (3.3) the power model.
The formulation in (3.3) is well-suited for evaluating the degree of conservatism in belief
revision (cf. Edwards, 1968).

However, the power model is inadequate for evaluating system

neglect, because it explicitly assumes that parameter values are constant across different systems.
System neglect, on the other hand, suggests that these parameter values will vary systematically,
reflecting insensitivity to system changes. To clarify the limitations of the power model, consider a
more general formulation in which β depends on the diagnosticity condition n, d nβn . For example, in
the Bayesian model βn = 1 for all n, implying that d nβn increases linearly as diagnosticity increases.
In the power model, β may be less than 1 (as in conservatism) or greater than 1 but must be constant
across all conditions. Thus, the power model is actually quite sensitive to changes in environmental
conditions.

Indeed, the responsiveness in the power model increases proportionally with the

underlying parameter, with the proportion determined by the degree of conservatism. Note also that
this model restricts behavior to be exclusively conservative (if βn < 1 ) or exclusively “radical” (if
βn > 1 ), and thus permits only under-reaction or over-reaction, respectively.

The system-neglect hypothesis predicts that parameter values differ systematically in each
condition. To illustrate, consider the extreme case of complete system neglect, in which individuals
respond to signals identically regardless of the system producing the signals. For β, complete system
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neglect requires that d1β1 = d 2β2 = d3β3 . In our experimental design, d1 = 1.5, d 2 = 3.0 , and d3 = 9.0 .
Thus, the equality required by complete system neglect implies that β1 = k , β2 = .37k , and
β3 = .18k , where k is any positive constant. Of course, this illustrates only the extreme version of

system neglect. More generally, system neglect requires that for qm < qn and d m < d n , parameter
estimates be ordered so that α m > α n and βm > βn .
To evaluate this prediction, we generalize (3.3) as follows. Let
α = α1Q1 + α 2Q2 + α 3Q3 + α 4Q4 and β = β1D1 + β2 D2 + β3D3 ,

(3.4)

where Qm is a dummy variable corresponding to transition probability qm , and Dn is a dummy
variable corresponding to diagnosticity condition d n . This approach explicitly allows α m and βn to
vary across environmental conditions, thus providing a formal test of the system-neglect hypothesis.
The power model is a special case of this model in which α1 = α 2 = α 3 = α 4 and β1 = β2 = β3 , and
the Bayesian model is a special case of the power model in which α m = βn = 1 for all m, n .
Note that while the system-neglect hypothesis does not make any predictions about the
overall level of conservatism in a particular environment, it does make explicit predictions, via the
monotonic ordering of α m and βn , about the pattern of over- and under-reaction. The systemneglect model explicitly allows for mixed patterns of over-reaction ( α m , βn > 1 for some m, n ) and
under-reaction ( α m , βn < 1 for some m, n ).
We fit pte , using the model in (3.3) and manipulating the odds form. We use nonlinear
regression with the usual assumption that errors are normally distributed around zero.3 We estimate
this model for each of the 600 observations using the median judgment for each observation. We
also estimate the model for each of the 40 individual subjects.
We estimate both the “power model” and the “system-neglect model” (3.4). The estimates
for the models are shown in Figure 4. Recall that system neglect predicts α m > α n and βm > βn for
m > n . These orderings provide 9 pairwise comparisons as empirical tests of the system-neglect

3

Residual analysis indicates this is a good assumption.
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hypotheses, 6 for the α-coefficients and 3 for the β-coefficients. All 9 pairs of estimates are in the
direction predicted by system neglect, and all are significantly different (all comparisons, p < .01 ).4
Note also that parameter values are both greater than and less than one. This implies the coexistence
of conservative and radical belief-revision, an important fact concealed by the power model.
There are three inferences to draw from Figure 4. First, comparing the level of the system
neglect plot with the Bayesian plot reveals the overall level of conservatism: lower levels imply
greater conservatism. Second, comparing the slope of the system-neglect model with the Bayesian
model and complete-neglect models reveals the degree of system neglect: the steeper the slope, the
more system neglect. The parameter estimates are close but distinguishable from complete neglect.
Finally, comparing the system-neglect model with the power model reveals the benefit of using the
system-neglect model: greater differences imply greater value. Figure 4 shows system neglect for
both parameters.5
We also estimated the system-neglect model for individual subjects. Overall, this model fits
the individual-level data reasonably well, with most individual-level parameter estimates ordered as
predicted. Recall that the system-neglect hypothesis suggests that as system parameters increase,
model estimates will decrease, suggesting 9 pairwise comparisons (6 for the α-coefficients and 3 for
the β-coefficients). Across all subjects, 79% of the α-coefficients and 77% of the β-coefficients are
ordered in the predicted direction.
Finally, we evaluated performance at different points in time to consider the effect of
experience. Recall that subjects experience 18 trials over the course of the experiment (in addition to
two practice trials) and thus might learn to avoid system neglect. We divide the session into four
“quarters” comprising of 4, 5, 5, and 4 trials, estimating system-neglect models for each quarter
separately. Because behavior in the final 3 quarters appears similar and learning appears limited to
the first quarter, we aggregate those 3 quarters and compare them against the first quarter. While we
The fits of the models are as follows: power model ( R 2 = .86 ), system-neglect model ( R 2 = .95 ), and
Bayesian model ( R 2 = .84 ). Since the purpose of the estimation is to test our psychological hypothesis, we do not
emphasize the goodness of fit.
4
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find significant system-neglect in both periods, it is more pronounced in the first quarter.
Specifically, we observe much greater sensitivity to low transition-probabilities in the first quarter
than in the subsequent quarters. Nevertheless, significant system-neglect persists throughout the
experiment. Parameter values for each quarter are reported in ECP.
System Neglect
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Bayesian

1.69
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1.16
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Figure 4: Parameter estimates for models fitting Study 1 median data using nonlinear
regression. The left panel depicts the α parameters (transition probability), and the right panel
depicts the β parameters (diagnosticity). Standard errors for the system neglect and power
models are in parentheses and indicated by the vertical bars. A version of the complete neglect
model is given as a theoretical baseline. Note that the complete-neglect model is not unique
and includes all parallel translations.

Discussion
Study 1 reflects system neglect at two levels. First, subjects show the hypothesized gradient
of under- and over-reaction: under-reaction is most prevalent in high diagnosticity/high transition
probability systems, and over-reaction occurs most in low diagnosticity/low transition probability
systems. Second, this pattern is reflected in our formal test of system neglect. Estimation of our
quasi-Bayesian model produced diagnosticity and transition-probability parameters that were all
ordered consistently with the system-neglect hypothesis. These estimates indicate that individuals
are sensitive to changes in normatively relevant environmental parameters, but insufficiently so.
Indeed, the parameter estimates are much closer to complete neglect than Bayesian updating. These
findings echo the observations of previous researchers in non-stationary environments (Chinnis &
5

We also estimated a “decay” model in which more distant observations received less weight. Although
this model revealed reliable decay, the magnitude was slight and incorporating this additional parameter did not
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Peterson, 1968; Barry & Pitz, 1979). Individual-level analyses provide similar support. Though
there is significant heterogeneity, the vast majority of subjects exhibit system neglect.
On the whole, although we see slightly more under-reaction than over-reaction, we reiterate
that the system-neglect hypothesis is agnostic about the overall level of under- and over-reaction.
Rather, system neglect predicts a relative effect, not an absolute one.

4. STUDY 2: JUDGMENT AND ERROR
It is possible that the behavior we observe in Study 1 is a statistical artifact generated by
regression effects or asymmetric error (Budescu, Erev, & Wallsten, 1997). For example, if the
Bayesian standard calls for an estimate of 1, the only possible error is under-estimation. Erev et al.
show how an error model can explain the co-existence of under- and over-confidence. Such error
models are increasingly popular in both psychology and economics, and have been used to explain
non-expected utility behavior (Hey & Orme, 1994; Hey, 1995; Ballinger & Wilcox, 1997), as well as
overconfidence (Erev, Wallsten, & Budescu, 1994; Brenner, 2000). While there is little doubt that
asymmetric error contributes to under- and over-reaction in both experimental and real-world
settings, we believe that error is not necessary for producing the patterns observed in Study 1. To
investigate this, we conducted a second judgment study to test specifically for the necessity of the
error explanation.
In Study 2 we matched sequences to systems to produce the same Bayesian posterior. In
some cases the system was strongly suggestive of change (e.g., an unstable and precise system) while
the signal was not, while in other cases the signal was strongly suggestive of change while the
system was not (e.g., a stable and noisy system). This design allows us to differentiate the systemneglect hypothesis from an error explanation. An error model of the type suggested by Erev et al.
would predict no differences in reaction across the systems since we hold the Bayesian posterior
constant. On the other hand, system neglect predicts a gradient identical to the one shown in Study
1, in which suggestive signals are given much more weight than suggestive systems.

significantly improve the model.
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Methodology
The methodology used is identical to that used in Study 1 with a few notable exceptions. The
experiment consisted of 2 practice trials followed by 30 trials, each consisting of 6 periods.
Our study used a 3 × 3 × 3 design, crossing three different transition probability levels (.05,
.10, and .15), three different diagnosticity levels ( d = pR / pB of 1.5, 2.33, and 4), and three Bayesian
posterior probabilities (.4, .5, and .6). We constructed 3 sequences for each of the 9 system cells to
correspond to each Bayesian posterior probability level. Thus, sequences were matched to systems
to

produce

nearly

identical

posterior

( r1 = 1 , r2 = 1 , r3 = 1 , r4 = 0 , r5 = 0 , r6 = 0 )

and

probabilities.

For

example,

sequences

( r1 = 1 , r2 = 1 , r3 = 0 , r4 = 1 , r5 = 0 , r6 = 1 )

of

yielded

posteriors of .413 and .415 for ( d = 1.5 , q = .05 ) and ( d = 4.0 , q = .15 ), respectively. The matches
were approximate, ranging from posteriors of .381 to .420, .470 to .520, and .586 to .619. The
average across all 3 matches ranged from .491 to .511 across the 9 cells. We also included 3
additional “filler” sequences to yield a total of 30 sequences. Each of the subjects received all 30
sequences in a randomized order. The actual sequences are found in ECP.
The need to match Bayesian posteriors across different systems influenced our decision to
use sequences of 6 observations (as opposed to 10), as well as more moderate parameter values (e.g.,
maximum diagnosticity of 4) and Bayesian posteriors (40-60%). Since the sequences were not
drawn randomly, we also matched the frequency of the “actual regimes” to the Bayesian posteriors.
For example, of the 15 instances in which the Bayesian posterior was between .45 and .55, we let 8
of 15 (53%) be generated by the blue bin and 7 of 15 (47%) be generated by the red bin.
We recruited 32 University of Chicago undergraduates as subjects. The scoring scheme was
similar to that used in Study 1. We used a quadratic scoring system that paid $0.08 maximum (e.g.,
if a subject indicated with certainty that the process was in the blue regime, and the process was in
fact in the blue regime) and -$0.08 minimum (e.g., if a subject indicated with certainty that the
process was in the blue regime, and the process was in fact in the red regime).
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Subjects were given feedback at the end of each trial as to if and when the process shifted
from the red regime to the blue regime. They were also informed how much money they made (or
lost) on that particular trial.

Results
We present both aggregate and individual-level results. Recall that our experiment required
that each of our 32 subjects provide subjective probabilities that the process had switched to the blue
regime for each of 6 signals in 30 trials. Let pte be the empirical judgment and | pte − ptb | be the
absolute difference between the subject’s judgments and the Bayesian probability for signal t.
Payments were based on the difference between their subjective probability of a change to the blue
regime and the actual regime (1 if blue, 0 if red). The mean of this absolute difference was .33
(median=.20, sd=.35), generating an average payment of $7.70 (range of $4.80 to $9.35). The
average payment to a Bayesian agent would have been $10.16.
To test for system neglect, we consider how our measure of under-reaction, p6e − p6b , changes
across the 9 experimental cells. We consider only the 6th observation since posteriors are matched
only on this observation. We show this measure pooled across the 3 posterior probability levels in
Figure 5. We see the predicted gradient: over-reaction tends to be strongest when diagnosticity and
transition probability are low, and under-reaction tends to be strongest when diagnosticity and
transition probability are high. In pairwise comparisons of cells, the pattern of under-reaction is
generally as predicted, with pairwise comparisons correctly ordered in 23 of 27 comparisons.
We also performed a similar individual-level analysis of the data. For each subject, we
considered the pattern of under- and over-reaction, averaging the measure of reaction, p6e − p6b , over
each of the 3 Bayesian posterior levels. We then counted how many of the 27 pairwise comparisons
were ordered as required by system neglect. 29 of 32 subjects had a majority of comparisons in the
predicted direction (14 or higher of 27). The number of pairwise comparisons in the predicted
direction ranged from 5 to 27 (median=19, mean=18.6).
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Estimation
We fit the system-neglect model to the Study 2 data using the same basic procedure outlined
earlier. As before, we fit pte , using nonlinear regression and the model in (3.3). This model was
estimated for the 162 observations using the median judgment for each observation. The estimates
are found in Figure 6. The pattern of parameter estimates looks very similar to that found with Study
1. The slope of the estimates is consistent with system neglect, and the parameter estimates are close
to what would be obtained by a complete-neglect model.

20%
Over-Reaction

Median Deviation:
Empirical - Bayesian

10%

0%

-10%

-20%
1.5
2.33

Under-Reaction

-30%

4

5%

Diagnosticity

10%
15%

Transition Probability

Figure 5: Over- and under-reaction, by condition, for each of the 3 levels of posterior probability
and aggregated over the 3 levels, as measured by the difference between median empirical
probability judgments and the median Bayesian probabilities, p6e − p6b (Study 2)

Discussion
Study 2 investigated the possible role of random error in the pattern found in Study 1.
Whereas asymmetric error almost certainly contributes to system neglect, Study 2 indicates there is
more to system neglect than just error. We find the same strong pattern of under- and over-reaction
predicted by the system-neglect hypothesis even after neutralizing the role of error. This study also
demonstrates the extent to which signals are privileged over systems. By design, the gradient we
observe in this study reveals the relative emphasis of signals over systems.
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Unlike Study 1, the sequences used in Study 2 were not randomly generated. We did so to
create a very stark test between the error account and system neglect. In theory, this approach could
bias judgments in favor of the system-neglect hypothesis, as subjects may discount system
parameters after observing a sequence that is not representative of a particular system. We regard this
possibility as highly unlikely since it would require that subjects are sensitive to both the underlying
systems and the representativeness of sequences drawn from them. Overall, we believe the approach
in this study complements Study 1, in which we use randomly generated sequences.
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Figure 6: Parameter estimates for models fitting Study 2 median data using nonlinear
regression. The left panel depicts the α parameters (transition probability), and the right panel
depicts the β parameters (diagnosticity). Standard errors for the system-neglect and power
models are in parentheses and indicated by the vertical bars. A version of the complete-neglect
model is given as a theoretical baseline. Note that the complete-neglect model is not unique
and includes all parallel translations.

5. STUDY 3: CHOICE TASK
The experimental design of Study 3 was similar to that of Studies 1 and 2. The major
difference was that subjects were asked to predict the color of the next ball rather than to provide a
probability estimate.

Experimental Design
The program, written in Visual Basic, included several screens of introduction, 2 practice
trials, and 18 trials of 10 periods each. For each trial, subjects were shown the relevant parameters,
pR , pB , and q, governing that trial. They were then shown a sequence of red or blue balls drawn
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randomly based on the set of parameters. Before seeing each signal, subjects were asked to predict
the color of the next ball.
As in Study 1, we varied diagnosticity and transition probability. Study 3 used almost the
same parameters as Study 1: ( pR , pB ) = (.6,.4), (.75,.25), and (.9,.1) and q =.025, .05, .10, and .20
( q = .02 was used in Study 1). Thus our 3 × 4 design yields 12 experimental conditions. We
randomly generated 3 unique sequences for each of these 12 conditions, creating 36 total sequences.
Each subject experienced half of the sequences, and either 1 or 2 of the 3 sequences from each
condition. Sequences were randomized for each subject.
We recruited 50 University of Chicago students to participate in this study. The median
number of undergraduate and graduate mathematics and statistics classes taken by our subjects was
again 3. Subjects did not receive feedback regarding if or when a change actually occurred, nor were
they shown the optimal (Bayesian) responses. They did, however, find out immediately whether
their prediction was correct. We paid subjects 9 cents for each correct prediction (out of 180).

Normative Model
As in Study 1, we use the Bayesian response as the standard for evaluating subject behavior.
Recall that (3.1) gives us the Bayesian probability that the process has switched to the blue regime
at t − 1 : ptb−1 = Pr( Bt −1 | H t −1) . The probability, then, that a ball is drawn from the blue regime at t,
Pr( Bt | H t −1) , is ptb−1 + (1 − ptb−1)q , and the probability that a blue ball is observed, Pr(rt = 0 | H t −1) , is

( ptb−1 + (1 − ptb−1)q)(1 − pB ) + (1 − ptb−1)(1 − q)(1 − pR ) , which is greater than .5 if and only if
Pr( Bt | H t −1) = ptb−1 + (1 − ptb−1)q > .5 . Normatively, then, a subject should predict a blue ball if she
believes the process is in the blue regime, and predict a red ball otherwise (assuming the rewards for
correct predictions are symmetric, as is true in our study).

Experimental Results
We begin by comparing the accuracy of the empirical predictions to the accuracy of the
Bayesian predictions. The Bayesian predictions (69%) were better than the empirical predictions
(64%). However, there was considerable heterogeneity in accuracy across subjects, with accuracy
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rates ranging from 59% to 73%. Thus, payments ranged from $9.63 to $11.79 (mean=$10.62). A
Bayesian agent would make $11.20 on average.
As in Study 1, our primary interest is belief revision. In the present context, we observe
belief revisions when subjects change their predictions. Let cte ( ctb ) be the subject’s prediction
(Bayesian prediction) of the color of the t-th ball ( ct = 0 if a blue ball is predicted). Thus, an

empirical belief-revision corresponds to cte ≠ cte−1 , whereas a Bayesian belief-revision corresponds to
ctb ≠ ctb−1 . Fewer empirical than Bayesian belief-revisions implies under-reaction, while the opposite
implies over-reaction. Across all conditions, we observe belief revisions at the rate of 16.1%
(empirical) and 11.3% (Bayesian). Thus, on average, subjects revise their predictions 42% more
often than the normative prediction. By this measure, there is an overall tendency to over-react.
We next turn to how this measure varies across experimental conditions. Recall that system
neglect implies over-reaction will be most extreme in stable/noisy environments and least extreme in
unstable/precise environments. Figure 7 depicts the difference between the percentage of empirical
and Bayesian belief-revisions across all 12 experimental conditions. Positive values indicate that
empirical changes exceed Bayesian changes, and, thus, over-reaction. We observe the predicted
gradient between the southeast cell (unstable/precise) and the northwest cell (stable/noisy). Underreaction is concentrated in the southeast corner and over-reaction in the northwest corner, as system
neglect suggests.
As an alternative measure of over- and under-reaction, we consider the amount of evidence
required to induce a blue-ball prediction.

Normatively, this threshold should not vary across

conditions: as soon as the data suggest that the blue regime is more likely than the red regime,
subjects should predict a blue ball. The system-neglect hypothesis, on the other hand, suggests that
individuals will require substantially more evidence, objectively measured, in unstable/precise
environments than in stable/noisy environments.
To test this prediction, we analyzed behavior in the following way. For every trial that a
subject completed, we identified the period in which she first predicted a blue ball. This period
indicates the point at which the subject believes a regime shift has occurred. We then calculate the
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normative probability underlying that prediction, i.e., the Bayesian prior that a blue ball will be
drawn in that period. This is the evidence, objectively measured, on which the subject bases her
prediction. Finally, we take the mean of these probabilities for each experimental condition, pooling
all trials and subjects within each condition.

Figure 8 compares these means across all 12

experimental conditions.
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Figure 7: Over- and under-reaction as measured by belief revisions (Study 3, Choice Task).
Plotted are the differences in the frequency of Empirical and Bayesian belief-revisions for each
condition.

As predicted, thresholds are considerably higher in the southeast corner than in the northwest.
On average, subjects in the most unstable/precise environment required evidence indicating a .90
chance that the system has shifted to the blue regime in order to make their first blue prediction, i.e.,
they under-reacted. Conversely, when in the most stable/noisy environment they required only a .11
chance that the system has shifted to the blue regime in order to make their first blue prediction, i.e.,
they over-reacted.

Estimation
To formally test the system-neglect hypothesis for our choice task, we adapt our estimation
procedure to account for the binary dependent variable. We take a “single-agent stochastic choice
model” approach (e.g., Camerer & Ho, 1994; Wu & Gonzalez, 1996), modeling a “representative
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agent” with noise (see also, McFadden, 1981). There are two steps to this process. In the first step,
we obtain a subjective probability of drawing the next ball from the blue regime. We assume
subjects base their prediction on this probability. In the second step, we transform this subjective
probability into a stochastic prediction about the next observation, i.e., the probability that subjects
will predict a blue ball. The objective of this model is to match this probability with the observed
percentage of subjects predicting a blue ball.
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Figure 8: Mean Bayesian probability of having changed to the blue regime at the time of the
first blue prediction (Study 3, Choice Task). Bayesian probabilities are calculated at the time of
the first blue-ball prediction by each subject in each trial. This summary pools subjects and
trials within each condition.

Recall that pte−1 denotes the subjective probability that the t − 1 -th ball was drawn from the
blue regime. Since our subjects predict the t-th ball, we need to advance pte−1 one period as we did
with

the

normative

model.

Therefore,

we

take

πte = ( pte−1 + (1 − pte−1)q)(1 − pB ) +

(1 − pte−1)(1 − q)(1 − pR ) to be the subjective probability that a blue ball will be drawn from the blue

regime at t. Note that this is simply the normative expression with pte−1 substituted for ptb−1 .
Next we fit this subjective probability using (3.3) to the observed predictions. We denote the
percentage of subjects who predicted a blue ball for ball t, % Bt . In the normative model, subjects
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would predict a blue ball if πte > .5 (thus, % Bit would always be either 0 or 1). To fit empirical
observations, we assume a stochastic choice functional which allows the representative agent to be
imperfectly sensitive to πte ,

(

)

1/ 1 + exp ⎡⎣η − ψπte ⎤⎦ ,

(5.1)

where πte is estimated, as detailed in the previous paragraph, using either the power model or the
system-neglect model. Note that the response function captures how discriminating the pattern of
predictions is to changes in πte with discriminability increasing in η , and that (5.1) is symmetric if
η = .5ψ . We estimate η and ψ (as well as the parameters needed to fit πte ) using nonlinear least-

squares. We take the “error” to be the difference between (5.1) and % Bt , the percentage of subjects
who predicted a blue ball, and choose the parameters that minimize the sum of squared errors.
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Figure 9: Parameter estimates for models fitting Study 3 using the stochastic choice functional.
The left panel depicts the α parameters (transition probability), and the right panel depicts the β
parameters (diagnosticity). Standard errors for the system-neglect and power models are in
parentheses and indicated by the vertical bars. A version of the complete-neglect model is
given as a theoretical baseline. Note that the complete-neglect model is not unique and
includes all parallel translations.

The estimates for the power model and the system-neglect model are found in Figure 9.
Most significantly, model estimates for both parameters are ordered in the manner predicted by the
system-neglect hypothesis. As in Study 1, we take this ordering as the formal test of the systemneglect hypothesis. Recall that system neglect predicts that parameter estimates will decrease as
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system parameters increase, which for the present study implies α m > α n and βm > βn for m < n .
All 9 (6 α and 3 β) of the comparisons are ordered in the direction predicted by system neglect and
highly significant ( p < .001 ). The estimates also indicate significant variation in the degree of
reaction across environments: for both parameters we find a mixed pattern of over-reaction
( α m , βn > 1 for low m and n) and under-reaction ( α m , βn < 1 for high m and n).6
Figure 9 also shows the estimates for the system-neglect model relative to the Bayesian,
power, and complete-neglect models. Note that the system-neglect model is significantly steeper
than either the Bayesian model ( α m = βn = 1 ) or the power model ( α = .71, β = 1.41 ), reflecting the
importance of incorporating system neglect when modeling behavior in this domain. Note also that
whereas the system-neglect model differs from the complete-neglect model for the α parameters, it is
virtually indistinguishable from the complete-neglect model for the β parameters.

Discussion
In Study 3, we changed the task from judgment to choice. We again see evidence of system
neglect at two levels, graphically and formally in our parameter estimates. We measure under- and
over-reaction two different ways: switches in predictions or evidence required to make first blue
prediction.

Both measures show the posited pattern: the greatest under-reaction occurs in the

stable/noisy conditions (southeast), and the greatest over-reaction occurs in the unstable/precise
conditions (northwest). It is noteworthy that we observe the same general pattern even though the
measure of reaction is very different in Study 3 than in Study 1 (change in probability judgments),
and the task is in Study 3 is more natural and less cognitively taxing.
We also find formal support for system neglect. The system-neglect model gives a perfect
ordering of the parameter estimates. In sum, as in Study 1, subjects are sensitive to changing
environmental conditions, but insufficiently so.7 The estimation method used in Study 3 differs from

6

The response function is close to symmetric: η = 7.58 and ψ = 14.22 for the system-neglect model. The

system-neglect model ( R 2 = .97 ) fits the data better than either a power model ( R 2 = .83 ) or a Bayesian model
( R 2 = .82 ).
7
We do not estimate individual-level parameter values in Study 3 because the binary nature of the
dependent variable does not provide the statistical power to estimate individual-level models.
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the method used in Study 1 in that the dependent variable in Study 3 is the percentage of blue ball
predictions. Thus, we should be cautious in comparing the parameter estimates across the three
studies. That said, the estimates for α-parameters are remarkably similar, while the β-parameters in
Study 3 are more elevated than the β-parameters in Study 1, indicating a greater tendency to overreact in Study 3.
Recall that the system-neglect hypothesis addresses the relative likelihood of under- and
over-reaction across two environments and hence is agnostic on the overall level of over-reaction in a
particular environment. However, we believe psychological research in two other areas sheds light
on why these differences might occur. First, anchoring and insufficient adjustment (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1974) is more likely to occur in Study 1 than in Study 3. Subjects in Study 1 may anchor
on the system’s initial values (i.e., 0) or on their own previous estimates, then adjust too slowly in
response to new data. This process is less pronounced in Study 3 because binary choices preclude
small adjustments, as large discrete jumps are required. Second, stimuli-response compatibility is
different in the two studies. In both studies subjects respond to binary stimuli, either red or blue
balls. However, the manner in which subjects respond is different: with probability estimates in
Study 1 and with choices in Study 3. Thus, stimuli and response are compatible (both binary) in
Study 3 and incompatible in Study 1. Psychological research in other domains has emphasized the
influence of this type of compatibility (Slovic, Griffin & Tversky, 1990; Fischer & Hawkins, 1993).
Indeed, compatibility has been put forth as one explanation for the classic preference-reversal
demonstrations (Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1968; Grether & Plott, 1979; Tversky, Slovic, & Kahneman,
1990). It may also be that stimuli-response compatibility leads to more over-reaction in Study 3
since it facilitates “chasing noise.” Although a more complete psychological story awaits future
research, together these two lines of research offer complementary explanations for the observed

levels of responsiveness: anchoring facilitates under-reaction in Study 1, and compatibility facilitates
over-reaction in Study 3. Again, however, absolute levels of responsiveness are not the focus of this
paper.
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5. CONCLUSION
We investigated the ability of individuals to detect and respond to changes in a dynamic
environment. Normatively, behavior in these environments should depend on the system governing
the dynamic process. We find that while subjects are sensitive to system parameters (namely,
diagnosticity and transition probability), they are insufficiently so. We investigated system neglect
using different tasks (a judgment task in studies 1 and 2 and a choice task in study 3) and tests (by
evaluating the pattern of under- and over-reaction and by formally estimating parameter values
across experimental conditions).

In all cases we found strong support for the system-neglect

hypothesis.

Contributions
Our findings extend research in both stationary and non-stationary environments. First, it
adds to a growing body of psychological research that shows that individuals consistently overweight
the strength of evidence (such as indications of change) at the expense of the weight of evidence
(such as the system that produced those indications). The same psychological mechanism that
reconciles conservatism and representativeness in stationary judgment tasks seems to explain our
results. Koehler, Brenner, & Griffin (2002) have argued for a more general case-based approach to
judgment: individuals evaluate the particular case at hand, with little regard to the class to which the
case belongs. This attractive account unifies many of the classic findings in the heuristics and biases
literature.
Second, our results contribute empirically and theoretically to our understanding of how
individuals make judgments in nonstationary settings. Fischhoff & Beyth-Marom (1983) noted that
research in conservatism “was quietly abandoned” partly because of the mixed results and failure to
identify definitive psychological mechanisms. For many of the same reasons, research in regimeshift detection has been dormant for thirty years. Our studies find both under- and over-reaction, as
was first demonstrated in the 1960’s, but explain both types of responses in terms of a single
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theoretical notion.8 Our models have the additional advantage of providing a continuous parametric
specification that ranges from complete neglect to Bayesian.
Third, research in financial economics has documented the tendency of investors to underreact to short-term earnings news and over-react to long-term earnings news. Griffin & Tversky’s
(1992) strength and weight account has motivated theoretical models designed to explain these
findings (e.g., Barberis et al. 1998; Daniel et al. 1998), as well as experimental financial economics
investigations (e.g., Nelson et al. 2001; Bloomfield et al. 2002). Indeed, Barberis et al. (1998) and
Brav & Heaton (2002) have used regime-shift models to explain these regularities. In these models,
investors’ belief-revisions are Bayesian, an assumption challenged by the system-neglect hypothesis.
Our research suggests a very specific way in which individuals are quasi-Bayesian, and thus calls for
greater attention to the precision of market information about valuation-relevant parameters, as well
as the stability of those parameters. Investor insensitivity to these “system” parameters may well be
a culprit in the under- and over-reaction found in asset prices.

Alternative Explanations
We consider two possible alternative explanations for our results, risk aversion and random
error. In Study 1, we used a quadratic scoring rule that is truth-revealing for risk-neutral subjects.
Risk-neutrality is commonly assumed for the stakes involved in this study (Davis & Holt, 1993).
However, the quadratic scoring rule has a “flat maximum”, thus shading stated probabilities toward
.5 reduces variance substantially while sacrificing little expected value. Consequently, risk-aversion,
if sufficiently extreme, could play a role in the pattern demonstrated in Study 1. However, it would
not predict the pattern found in Study 2, where we held the Bayesian posterior probability constant.
It also plays no role in Study 3, since optimal behavior relies only on monotonic subjective
probabilities. Thus, risk-aversion cannot provide a general explanation for all experimental results.
Moreover, we have found results similar to those in Study 1 using linear payoff schemes that do not
have a “flat maximum”.
8

Indeed, Edwards (1968) actually reports evidence contrary to conservatism. His Figure 2.2 reports accuracy ratios
for three diagnosticity levels (accuracy ratios less than 1 indicate conservatism, while those greater than 1 indicate
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Likewise, error cannot provide a complete account of our pattern of data. Erev et al. offer an
error story in which responses are unbiased “true judgments” perturbed by error. This account
requires that the median response be unbiased. As expected, our pattern of over- and under-reaction
is less pronounced in median than mean data, but still highly significant. Study 2 deals with the error
account directly. Consistent with system neglect, we found a gradient identical to the one shown in
Study 1: subjects believed that the chance of a change was significantly higher when given a strong
signal in a weak system than when given a weak signal in a strong system.

Future Directions
Our evidence for system neglect thus far is limited to an experimental framework with
symmetric probabilities, binary signals, and absorbing states. Although we expect these findings to
be robust, system neglect in alternative environments merits direct investigation.

We have

communicated the true parameters of the statistical processes to our subjects, but in most situations a
decision maker is not aware of these parameters. The question of how individuals identify the
relevant parameters of an unspecified process is an important question that deserves further
investigation. It is also important to know whether experience improves performance, i.e., whether
subjects can learn to detect regime-shifts more effectively. We have conducted judgment and choice
studies in which subjects remain in one system for the entire study. These preliminary learning
studies indicate that experience can improve performance, but that this improvement is slight and
does not occur in all conditions (Wu & Massey, 2003).
While the system-neglect hypothesis is agnostic about levels of under- or over-reaction, a
number of psychological factors might influence the responsiveness to signals in the laboratory and
real world. We have found that the decision task, judgment versus choice, influences the level of
under- or over-reaction. An additional factor that deserves attention is motivated reasoning. Kunda
(1990) has argued that individuals are motivated processors of ambiguous evidence. Thus, a decision
maker with a vested interest in the continuation of an incumbent regime (such as a “bricks and

radical belief-revision). The accuracy ratios differ in the direction system neglect would predict, with the lowest
diagnosticity condition (d=.55/.45) actually showing radical belief-revision.
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mortar” retailer) might be slower to react than someone who profits from a new regime (such as an
“e-tailer”).
In addition, the payoffs in most business situations are not symmetric, i.e., under-reaction and
over-reaction are not punished equally. Rather, changing strategies is costly in real terms, whether it
be shifting resources, building or closing new facilities, or acquiring new expertise. These costs may
provide an economic rationalization, legitimate or not, for under-reaction.

Moreover, the

susceptibility of decision makers to sunk costs and commitment escalation creates a psychological
asymmetry as well, which can lead decision makers to believe too long in the current regime (e.g.,
Thaler, 1980; Staw, 1981).
We conclude by discussing some implications for decision making.

Much popular

management literature has called for organizations to be nimble, reactive, and flexible (Bhide, 2000;
Hamel, 2000; Schoemaker, 1995).

What often goes unsaid is that organizations must be

appropriately reactive. Clearly there is a trade-off between flexibility and perseverance. This
research suggests there are environments in which decision makers are prone to stay the course when
they should change direction, and change direction when they should stay the course.
Dixit & Nalebuff (1991) suggest, “Even though you can’t guess right all the time, you can at
least recognize the odds.” (p.169) We push that sentiment back a step: “Even if you can’t calculate
the odds, you can at least understand your environment.” Our research shows that understanding
one’s environment is critical to reacting appropriately. Indeed, regardless of whether the task is to
“guess right” or to “calculate the odds”, individuals emphasize indications-of-change over the
environment producing those indications. Decision makers would be well served to counter this bias
by allocating more resources to evaluating their environment, actively investigating signal
diagnosticity and system stability.

Understanding one’s environment is crucial to correctly

interpreting events and, hence, managing the tension between under- and over-reaction.
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APPENDIX: DERIVATION OF BAYESIAN RESPONSE
Consider a Bernoulli process that can take on one of two regimes, a “red” probability regime
(R) and a “blue” probability regime (B). Let θt be the regime in period t. Rt ( Bt ) indicates that the
process is in the red (blue) regime in period t, i.e., θt = R (and θt = B ). The process begins in the red
regime (i.e., θ0 = R or R0 ). However, the process may switch to the blue regime at any time
including period 1. The probability of the process changing from the red regime to the blue regime is
given by a “transition probability”, q = Pr( Bt | Rt −1) . We assume that the blue regime is an absorbing
state, Pr( Bt | Bt −1) = 1 .
Let rt be an indicator variable, such that rt = 1 if a red ball is drawn and rt = 0 otherwise,
and H t = (r1,..., rt ) be the history of signals. Finally, let pR = Pr(rt = 1| Rt ) and pB = Pr(rt = 1| Bt ) for
all t denote the probability of a red signal in the Red and Blue regimes respectively, and d = pR / pB
denote diagnosticity.
Pr( Bt | H t )

To calculate the posterior odds,

Pr( Rt | H t )

, we consider the numerator and denominator

separately:
t
⎞
⎛ j −1
⎞⎛ t
Pr( Bt | H t ) = ∑ ⎜ ∏ Pr( Rk | Rk −1) Pr(rk | Rk ) ⎟ ⎜ ∏ Pr( B j | R j −1) Pr(rk | Bk ) ⎟ =
⎜
⎟
j =1 ⎝ k =1
⎠⎝ k= j
⎠
t

j −1

t

j =1

k =1

k= j

∑ q(1 − q) j −1∏ Pr(rk | Rk )∏ Pr(rk | Bk ) ,

(1)

and
t

t

k =1

k =1

Pr( Rt | H t ) = ∏ Pr( Rk | Rk −1) Pr(rk | Rk ) = (1 − q)t ∏ Pr(rk | Rk ) .

(2)

Note that (1) captures the multiple paths that might result in θt = B , i.e., {θ1 = B},
{θ1 = R, θ2 = B},...,{θ1 = R,..., θt −1 = R, θt = B} . Using (1) and (2), we write the posterior odds as
t

Pr( Bt | H t )
Pr( Rt | H t )

j −1

t

∑ q(1 − q) ∏ Pr(r
j −1

| Rk )∏ Pr(rk | Bk )

k

=

j =1

k =1

k= j

t

(1 − q) ∏ Pr(rk | Rk )
t

=

t

∑ (1 − q)
j =1

t

q

t − j +1

Pr(rk | Bk )

∏ Pr(r
k= j

k

| Rk )

.

(3)

k =1

1− rk

rk

⎛ p ⎞ ⎛ 1 − pB ⎞
= ⎜⎜ B ⎟⎟ ⎜⎜
Noting that
⎟
Pr(rk | Rk ) ⎝ pR ⎠ ⎝ 1 − pR ⎟⎠
Pr(rk | Bk )

⎛p ⎞
= ⎜⎜ B ⎟⎟
pR = 1 − pB ,
P ( rj | R ) ⎝ p R ⎠
P ( rj | B )

and, for the special case of a symmetric process,

2 r j −1

=d

1− 2 r j

, we can simplify (3) to
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Pr( Bt | H t )
Pr( Rt | H t )

t

=∑
j =1

q
(1 − q)

t

t

d 1− 2rk = ∑
t − j +1 ∏
k= j

j =1

q
(1 − q)

⎛ t
⎞
t − j +1− ⎜ 2 rk ⎟
⎜
⎟
⎝ k= j ⎠

∑

d
t − j +1

.

(4)

The exponent on d is simply the difference between the number of blues and number of reds over
the path being evaluated.
Note that the unconditional likelihood is given by
Pr( Bt )
Pr( Rt )

=

1 − (1 − q)t
(1 − q)t

,

(5)

which expresses the “base rate” odds of being in Bt and Rt . Factoring (5) out of (4), we get
⎛
⎜

t

⎞
⎟

rk
⎟
⎛ 1 − (1 − q)t ⎞ t q(1 − q) j −1 t +1− j −⎜⎝ 2∑
k= j ⎠
=⎜
d
.
⎟
∑
t
t
Pr( Rt | H t ) ⎝ (1 − q) ⎠ j =1 1 − (1 − q)

Pr( Bt | H t )

(6)
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